Consider the problem of maximizing the revenue from selling a number of goods to a single buyer. We show that, unlike the case of one good, when the buyer's values for the goods increase the seller's maximal revenue may well decrease. We also provide a characterization of revenue-maximizing mechanisms (more generally, of "sellerfavorable" mechanisms) that circumvents nondifferentiability issues.
Introduction
Consider the problem of a seller who wishes to maximize the revenue from selling multiple goods to a single buyer with private information about his value for the goods. In contrast to the one-good case where a complete solution has been known for years, 1 a general solution in the case of multiple goods remains elusive and, except under special circumstances, 2 very little is known even about the form of the solution or its properties. The purpose of the present note is to provide simple examples that highlight some important differences between the one-good and the multiple-good cases, and to provide a treatment of incentive compatibility that avoids nondifferentiability issues which, while ultimately harmless, are often a distracting nuisance within the analysis.
In Section 3, we exhibit the surprising phenomenon that the seller's maximal revenue may well decrease when the buyer's values for the goods increase. This revenue nonmonotonicity can occur only when there is more than one good : revenue is easily shown to be nondecreasing in the buyer's value when there is only a single good.
In Section 2, we restrict attention to "seller-favorable" mechanisms and characterize their revenue using directional derivatives, which exist everywhere (and therefore circumvent nondifferentiability issues arising from incentive compatibility).
In Section 4, we present a simple example where randomization is necessary for revenue maximization, and clarify why randomization is needed only when there are multiple goods.
Since the maximal revenue problem appears significantly less well behaved when the values of the goods are correlated (cf.
3 Nisan 2012a, 2012b) , it is important to obtain examples with independent, and even independent and identically distributed, values. We do so both for 1 See Myerson (1981) , who also allows for multiple buyers.
2 See, e.g., Armstrong (1996) , Thanassoulis (2004) , Pycia (2006) , Vincent (2006, 2007) , and Pavlov (2011) .
3 For instance, deterministic mechanisms always ensure at least one half of the maximal revenue in the independent case, versus an arbitrarily small fraction in the general (correlated) case.
revenue-nonmonotonicity and for randomization.
Preliminaries
The seller possesses k ≥ 1 goods (or "items"), which are worth nothing to him (and there are no costs). The valuation of the goods to the buyer is given by a vector 4 x = (x 1 , x 2 , ..., x k ) ∈ R k , where x i is his value for good i.
The valuation is assumed to be additive over the goods: the value of a set L ⊂ {1, 2, ..., k} of goods is i∈L x i . The buyer knows the valuation vector x, whereas the seller knows only that x is drawn from a given probability distribution F on R k with support D. We make no further assumptions on F. In particular, F may possess atoms and its support D may be finite or infinite and hence need not be convex or even connected. The seller and the buyer are each risk-neutral and have quasilinear utilities. A (direct) mechanism for selling the k goods is given by a pair of functions (q, s), where q : D → [0, 1] k and s : D → R. If the buyer reports that his valuation is x, then q i (x) ∈ [0, 1] is the probability that he receives good i (for i = 1, ..., k), and s(x) is the payment that the seller receives from the buyer. When the buyer reports his valuation x truthfully, his payoff is
, where q(x) ≡ (q 1 (x), ..., q k (x)), and the seller's payoff is 5 s(x). A mechanism (q, s) is individually rational (IR) if
By the Revelation Principle, the maximal revenue from the distribution F is Rev(
, where x is distributed according to F, and the supremum is over all IC and IR mechanisms (q, s). If (q, s) is IC, then it is useful to extend the buyer's payoff function b from
is the range of (q, s). So defined, b is a convex function, being the pointwise supremum of affine functions. The IC property of (q, s) ensures that the 4 R denotes the real line, R k the k-dimensional Euclidean space, and R k + = {x ∈ R k : x ≥ 0} its nonnegative orthant. Negative valuations are not ruled out.
5 In the literature this is called transfer, cost, price, or revenue, and denoted by t, c, p, and so on. We hope that using the mnemonic s for the seller's final payoff and b for the buyer's final payoff will avoid confusion.
values of b remain unchanged on D, and also ensures that b is finite for every x ∈ R k . Henceforth, "the buyer's payoff function b" will mean the above extension of b to all of 6 R k .
Let f be a real convex function defined on
z i holds for every x, z ∈ R k with z ≥ 0 then the function f is nondecreasing and nonexpansive.
7
Let B k be the collection of all real functions on R k that are nondecreasing, nonexpansive, and convex.
Seller-Favorable Mechanisms
When maximizing revenue one may without loss of generality consider only mechanisms that are "seller-favorable," which means that whenever the buyer is indifferent he chooses an outcome that maximizes the seller's revenue (i.e., ties are broken by the buyer in favor of the seller). Formally, an incentivecompatible mechanism (q, s) with buyer's payoff function b is seller-favorable if there is no other incentive-compatible mechanism (q,s) having the same payoff function b for the buyer (i.e.,q(x) · x −s(x) = b(x) for all x in D) and such thats(x) ≥ s(x) for every x ∈ D, with strict inequality for some x. In this section we will see that the restriction to seller-favorable mechanisms simplifies the analysis (it circumvents nondifferentiability issues); moreover, seller-favorable mechanisms arise not only from revenue-maximization considerations, but also from strict implementation.
8
The characterization of IC mechanisms (q, s) as being those whose assignment function, q, is a subgradient of the buyer's convex payoff function is well known (starting with Rochet 1985) . It is an inconvenient and often technically annoying fact that the buyer's convex payoff function, while dif-6 The domain D is irrelevant, as any IC mechanism can be extended to the whole space R k (see footnote 12 below). 7 For convex f, this is equivalent to 0 ≤ ∂f (x)/∂x i ≤ 1 for all i and all x where the derivative exists (i.e., a.e.).
8 See the last paragraph of Remark (a) at the end of this section.
ferentiable almost everywhere, need not be differentiable everywhere. Proofs that are otherwise simple and elegant often require detours through subgradient selection arguments.
9
Such detours can be avoided when one restricts attention to seller-favorable mechanisms. The reason is that the buyer's payoff function is not differentiable only when he is indifferent between a number of reports. But if the mechanism (q, s) is seller-favorable, the buyer's truthful report must maximize the seller's payoff among all of the buyer's optimal reports. As we show, this implies that q(x) · x = b ′ (x; x) for every buyer valuation 10 x ∈ D.
Consequently, in a seller-favorable mechanism the buyer's payoff function, b, completely determines the seller's payoff function s at every x ∈ D, whether a point of differentiability of b or not, and
Lemma 1 If (q, s) is IC then the buyer's payoff function b belongs to B k and
Proof. Recall (Section 1.1) that b is a convex function and b(x) = sup (p,t)∈R (p· x − t), where R = {(q(x), s(x)) : x ∈ D} is the range of (q, s). IC also implies that the range of s(·) is bounded. Thus,R, the closure of R, is a compact subset of [0, 1] k × R, and so for every
Therefore, for every x, y ∈ R k we get
which says that p * (x) is a subgradient of Manelli and Vincent (2007) . 10 This formula holds even when D is a finite set since b is a convex function defined on all of R k . Hence b ′ (x; x) is well defined for every x ∈ R k , and in particular for
Letting ∂f (x) denote the set of subgradients of f at x (which is always a nonempty closed set), we have f ′ (x; y) = sup{p · y : p ∈ ∂f (x)} (see Rockafellar 1970) .
12 Note that (p * , t * ) is an IC mechanism on all of R k that extends the given IC mechanism (q, s) on D. This shows that it is without loss of generality to require the incentive constraints to hold on all of R k , and not merely on D.
x ∈ D. 
for all x.
Proof. Being nondecreasing, nonexpansive, and convex on R k , the function
(using the definitions ofs(y) ands(x), andq(x) ∈ ∂b(x)), and so (q,s) is IC.
Together, Lemmas 1 and 2 imply the following.
Corollary 3 Let (q, s) be an IC mechanism with buyer's payoff function b.
Consider now the problem of maximizing the seller's expected revenue subject to individual rationality (IR) for the buyer (i.e., b ≥ 0). Since it is without loss of generality to restrict attention to seller-favorable mechanisms, a consequence of Corollary 3 is the following.
Corollary 4 The seller's maximal expected revenue is
Remarks. (a) Strict implementation. Given any IC mechanism (q, s), there are numerous ways to eliminate, at arbitrarily small cost, the problem of the buyer having only weak incentives to report truthfully. For example, one can introduce an arbitrarily small positive probability that, after the buyer reports his valuation, the given (IC) mechanism is replaced by a random reserve price on each good. Another alternative is to choose any arbitrarily small ε > 0, and use instead the mechanism (q, (1 − ε)s) (it need not be IC), which amounts to giving a constant discount (fraction ε) on all prices. This mechanism guarantees to the seller, for any optimal choices of the buyer, a payoff of at least (1 − ε)s(x) for every valuation x of the buyer.
13 Thus, the seller is guaranteed at least 1−ε times his payoff in the original mechanism, regardless of which optimal report the buyer makes.
14
In fact, the (q, (1 − ε)s) mechanism guarantees to the seller not merely
, the maximal seller-favorable payoffs, for every 15 x (indeed, in the argument of footnote
support of F, letx be a boundary point of C, and let λ = 0 belong to the normal cone to C atx, i.e., λ·x ≥ λ·x for every x ∈ C. If λ·x ≥ 0 and (q, s) is seller-favorable, then we can assume w.l.o.g. thatq := q(x) is maximal in the direction λ, i.e.,q :=q
(by Corollary 3) and so b ′ (x;x) =q ·x and we can replaceq byq. Moreover, 13 If y is an optimal report of a buyer with valuation x (as in the proof of Lemma 1, one may need to consider the closure of the range of (q, (1 − ε)s)), then
(by IC of (q, s)). Hence s(y) ≥ s(x) (subtract and divide by ε), and so the seller's payoff, (1 − ε)s(y), is at least (1 − ε)s(x).
14 Thus the possibility of multiple optimal reports for the buyer, which is sometimes described as problematic (see for instance footnote 3 in Manelli and Vincent 2007) , in fact isn't.
15 Thus the tie-breaking rule in favor of the seller is obtained as the limit of any optimal behavior of the buyer in the perturbed mechanisms.
if λ ·x > 0 thenq ·x >q ·x = b ′ (x;x), a contradiction, and soq must be maximal in the direction λ.
In particular, we have:
, where e (i) ∈ R k + is the i-th unit vector);
then q i (x) = 1 whenx i = 1; take λ = e (i) );
is the right-derivative of the function t → b(tx) − tb(x) at t = 1 (these functions relate to the local returns to scale of b). If b(0) = 0 (which, when maximizing revenue, can always be assumed when 
19 What we compare is the maximal revenue from two given distributions, one having higher values than the other (formally, this means first-order stochastic dominance).
20 Another case where the revenue is easily seen to increase is when all valuations increase uniformly by the same amount (i.e., each x is replaced by x + z for a fixed vector z 0). it no longer holds when there are multiple goods. As a consequence, if the distribution F of the buyer's valuation is not precisely known, but a certain lower bound F 0 to F is given (in the first-order stochastic dominance sense), then computing the optimal revenue for F 0 does not necessarily yield a lower bound on the optimal revenue for F.
Monotonicity for one good
When there is only one good, i.e., k = 1, incentive compatibility (IC) implies that a buyer with a higher valuation pays no less than a buyer with a lower valuation. Thus increasing the valuation of the buyer can only increase the revenue.
Proposition 5 When there is one good, i.e., k = 1, if F 2 fist-order stochastically dominates F 1 then Rev(F 2 ) ≥Rev(F 1 ).
Proof. First, we claim that every IC mechanism is monotonic in the sense that the seller's payoff increases weakly with the buyer's value: if x > y then s(x) ≥ s(y). Indeed, for all x, y, the IC inequalities at x and at y imply (q(x) − q(y))x ≥ s(x) − s(y) ≥ (q(x) − q(y))y; when x > y it follows that q(x) − q(y) ≥ 0 and thus s(x) − s(y) ≥ 0.
Second, the first-order stochastic dominance implies that
for every IC mechanism, since s is a nondecreasing function.
Remark. Note that Proposition 5 also follows easily from Myerson's (1981) characterization of the optimal revenue when there is one good as Rev(F ) = sup p≥0 p · (1 − F (p)); however, the proof above shows that the monotonicity of the revenue holds not only for optimal mechanisms, but also for any incentive-compatible mechanism.
Nonmonotonicity for multiple goods
Now, does the above hold when there are more goods? That is, does increasing the buyer's valuations yield higher revenue to the seller? The surprising answer is that this is no longer true when there is more than one good. When there are multiple goods one can construct examples of IR and IC mechanisms that are not monotonic.
21 Take for instance the mechanism where the buyer is offered a choice among the following four outcomes: get nothing and pay nothing (with payoff = 0); or get good 1 for price 1 (with payoff = x 1 − 1); or get good 2 for price 2 (with payoff = x 2 − 2); or get both goods for price 4 (with payoff = x 1 + x 2 − 4); thus,
See Figure 1 for the regions in the buyer's valuation space where each outcome is chosen. If the valuation of the buyer is, say, (1.3, 2.4), then his optimal choice is to pay 2 for good 2, whereas if his values increase to, say, (1.7, 2.6), then his optimal choice is to pay 1 for good 1. Thus the seller receives a lower payment (1 instead of 2) when the buyer's values increase. The more difficult question is whether this nonmonotonicity can also occur for the maximal revenue. The two examples below, a simpler one where 21 The first such example was constructed with Noam Nisan. the unique optimal mechanism is precisely the above deterministic mechanism 22 (3) but the valuations of the two goods are correlated, and a more complicated one where the valuations of the two goods are independent and identically distributed, show that the maximal revenue can indeed be nonmonotonic.
Example E1. For every 0 ≤ α ≤ 1/4, let F α be the following distribution on R 2 :
(1, 1), with probability 1/4, (1, 2), with probability 1/4 − α, (2, 2), with probability α, (2, 3), with probability 1/2.
As α increases, probability mass is moved from (1, 2) to (2, 2), and so F α firstorder stochastically dominates F α ′ when α > α ′ . Nevertheless, the maximal revenue Rev(F α ) decreases with α (in the region 0 ≤ α ≤ 1/12).
Proposition 6 In Example E1: for every 0 ≤ α ≤ 1/12, Rev(F α ) = 11/4 − α.
Proof. First, the revenue of 11/4 − α is achieved by the mechanism with b given by (3): (1/4) · 1 + (1/4 − α) · 2 + α · 1 + (1/2) · 4 = 11/4 − α. Second, we show that a higher revenue cannot be obtained. Consider the following inequalities: The right-hand side is precisely the expected revenue at F α , and the left-hand side is at most 0 + 0 + (1/4 − 3α) + 2α + 1 + 3/2 = 11/4 − α (since q (3) is indeed maximal.
To get some intuition: the mechanism of (3) is:
Valuation Outcome
When the value of good 1 goes up (e.g., from x = (1, 2) to x ′ = (2, 2)), the probability of getting good 1 also goes up (i.e., q 1 (
this is always so, as it is a consequence of the convexity of the buyer's payoff function b). However, at the same time the probability of getting good 2 may go down (e.g., q 2 (x ′ ) = 0 < 1 = q 2 (x)); moreover, it can do so in such a way that the allocation is worth less to the buyer, and so his payment to the seller goes down (i.e., s(x ′ ) = 1 < 2 = s(x)).
Remarks. (a)
The mechanism (5) is the unique optimal mechanism at each F α with 0 ≤ α < 1/12; indeed, in order to get the revenue of 11/4 − α one needs all relevant inequalities to become equalities (thus q (b) Any small enough perturbation of the example-such as having full support on a square like [0, 3] 2 , or increasing all valuations as α increaseswill not affect the nonmonotonicity, since the inequality Rev(F 0 ) > Rev(F 1/12 ) is strict.
Nonmonotonicity for independent and identically distributed goods
We now provide an example of nonmonotonicity where the goods are independent and identically distributed.
Example E2. Let F 1 and F 2 be the following one-dimensional distributions:
10, with probability , 100, with probability .
Clearly F 2 first-order stochastically dominates F 1 (since F 2 is obtained from F 1 by moving a probability mass of 1/9000 from 10 to 13), which of course implies that F 2 × F 2 first-order stochastically dominates F 1 × F 1 . However, the optimal revenue from F 1 × F 1 turns out to be higher than the optimal revenue from F 2 × F 2 .
Proposition 7 In Example E2:
Proof. Maximizing revenue for a distribution with finite support is a linear programming problem (the unknowns are the q i (x) and s(x) for all x in the support, the constraints are the IR and IC inequalities, and the objective function is the expected revenue). Using Maple yields the following. (1, 1) 126
For F 1 ×F 1 the same mechanism is optimal; however, the 5 th and 6 th outcomes are not used (the value 13 has probability 0) and may be dropped. This yields: 
Lotteries and Revenue
In the case of a single good (i.e., k = 1), in order to maximize revenue it suffices to consider deterministic mechanisms (specifically, "posted-price" mechanisms; see Myerson 1981) . That is not so in the multi-good case. Examples where the optimal mechanism requires randomization (i.e., in some of the outcomes the probability of getting a good is strictly between 0 and 1) have been provided by Thanassoulis (2004) (in the slightly different context where the buyer's demand is limited to one good), Pycia (2006) , Vincent (2006, 2007) , 24 and Pavlov (2011, Example 3(ii) ). However, most of these examples are relatively complicated and require non-trivial computations, and it is not clear why and how randomization helps only when there are multiple goods. We will provide two examples that are simple and transparent enough that the need for randomization becomes clear. In the first, the values of the two goods are correlated; in the second, the values are independent and identically distributed.
Lotteries for multiple goods
Consider the following example with two goods and three possible valuations 25 (the values of the two goods are correlated).
24 Manelli and Vincent (2007) provide an example (Example 1) of an "undominated mechanism" that requires lotteries. While it is clear that an undominated mechanism is optimal for some distribution F, it is claimed there (Theorem 9) that any undominated mechanism is optimal for some distribution with independent goods (i.e., a product distribution). However, there is an error in the proof of Theorem 9, as the set of product distributions (specifically, the set G in their proof) is not convex.
25 Pycia (2006) solves the seller's problem when there are exactly two valuations and shows that randomizations may be needed. For instance, when the valuations are (2, 3) and (6, 1) with equal probabilities, the unique optimal mechanism gives buyer (2, 3), for the total price of 4, good 2 and a 1/2 chance of getting good 1; and gives buyer (6, 1) both goods for the total price of 7. However, we have found that Example E3, with Example E3. Let F be the following two-dimensional probability distribution:
(1, 0), with probability 1/3, (0, 2), with probability 1/3, (3, 3), with probability 1/3.
Proposition 8 The mechanism (q, s) defined by
(1, 0) (
is the unique revenue-maximizing IC and IR mechanism for F of Example E3.
Thus, the buyer can get both goods for price 5, or get good 2 for price 2, or get good 1 with probability 1/2 for price 1/2; the optimal revenue is 5/2 = 2.5. It can be shown 26 that if the seller were restricted to deterministic mechanisms (where each q i is either 0 or 1), then the optimal revenue would decrease to 7/3 = 2.33... (which is attained for instance by selling separately, at the optimal-single-good prices of 3 for good 1 and 2 for good 2). A detailed explanation of the role of randomization, and why it is needed only when there are multiple goods, follows the proof below.
Proof. Let (α 1 , β 1 ); σ 1 , (α 2 , β 2 ); σ 2 , and (α 3 , β 3 ); σ 3 be the outcome (q 1 (x), q 2 (x)); s(x) at x = (1, 0), (0, 2), and (3, 3), respectively (thus α i , β i ∈ three possible valuations, provides slightly more transparent insights (as there is a clearer separation between the IC and IR constraints).
26 See footnote 27.
[0, 1]). The objective function is S := σ 1 + σ 2 + σ 3 (this is 3 times the revenue). Consider the relaxed problem of maximizing S subject only to the individual rationality constraints at (1, 0) and (0, 2), and to the two incentive compatibility constraints at (3, 3), i.e.,
These inequalities can be rewritten as:
Therefore, in order to maximize S = σ 1 + σ 2 + σ 3 we must take σ 1 = α 1 and σ 2 = 2β 2 , which gives:
Thus we must take α 3 = β 3 = 1, β 1 = α 2 = 0, and then σ 3 = min{6 − 2α 1 , 6 − β 2 }, and so S = α 1 + 2β 2 + min{6 − 2α 1 , 6 − β 2 } = min{2β 2 − α 1 , β 2 + α 1 } + 6. Since S is increasing in β 2 we must take β 2 = 1, and then S = min{2 − α 1 , 1 + α 1 } + 6 is maximized at 27 α 1 = 1/2. This is pecisely the mechanism (6), which is easily seen to satisfy also all the other IR and IC constraints.
To understand the use of randomization, consider the outcome (1/2, 0); 1/2 at x = (1, 0) in (6): it is a lottery ticket that costs 1/2 and gives a 1/2 probability of getting good 1; alternatively, 28 it is a 1/2 − 1/2 lottery between getting good 1 for the price 1 (i.e., (1, 0); 1 ), and getting nothing and paying nothing (i.e., (0, 0); 0 ). It is thus the average of these two deterministic outcomes, and we now consider what happens when we replace the lottery by either one of them (see Table 1 below). It turns out that in both cases the revenue strictly decreases. In the first case, replacing (1/2, 0); 1/2 by (1, 0); 1 forces the price of the bundle to decrease to 4 (otherwise the (3, 3)-buyer would switch from paying 5 for the bundle to paying 1 for good 1); therefore the net change in the revenue is 1/3 · (1 − 1/2) + 1/3 · (4 − 5), which is negative. 29 In the second case, replacing (1/2, 0); 1/2 by (0, 0); 0 results in the loss of the revenue from the (1, 0)-buyer, without, however, increasing the revenue from the (3, 3)-buyer: indeed, if we were to increase the bundle price, then (3, 3) would switch to (0, 1); 2 , i.e., would get good 2 for price 2 (and, if we were to drop this outcome (0, 1); 2 altogether in order to increase the bundle price to 6, the total revenue would again decrease).
(1, 0) ( It is instructive to compare this with a similar example but with a single good. Assume the values are x = 1, 0, 3, with equal probabilities of 1/3 each (just like good 1 in Example E3). Take the mechanism with outcomes 1/2; 1/2 , 0; 0 , 1; 2 (see Table 2 below); it is easy to see that it is IC and IR, and its revenue is 5/6. The lottery outcome 1/2; 1/2 -get the good with probability 1/2 for price 1/2-is the average of 0; 0 and 1; 1 . Replacing the lottery 1/2; 1/2 by 1; 1 lowers the revenue to 2/3: the 3-buyer switches 28 Because of risk-neutrality. 29 The buyer's payoff function in this mechanism is b
(1) (x) = max{x 1 − 1, x 2 − 2, x 1 + x 2 − 4}.
30 The buyer's payoff function in this mechanism is b (2) (x) = max{0, x 2 − 2, x 1 + x 2 − 5}.
to 1; 1 . Replacing the lottery 1/2; 1/2 by 0; 0 increases the revenue to 1: the 3-buyer is now offered, and chooses, 1; 3 . The revenue of 5/6 of the original mechanism with the lottery outcome is precisely the average of the revenues from these two resulting mechanisms, 2/3 and 1 (this averaging property holds at each valuation x).
x q s q This is a general phenomenon when there is only one good: the revenue from a mechanism that includes an outcome that is a probabilistic mixture of two outcomes (a "lottery outcome") is the average of the revenues obtained by replacing the lottery with each one of these two outcomes and then adapting the remaining outcomes.
31 Formally, this is the counterpart of expressing the corresponding b ∈ B 1 as an average of two functions in B 1 ; in the example above, b(x) = max{0, x/2 − 1/2, x − 2} is the 1/2 − 1/2 average of b (1) (x) = max{0, x − 1} and b (2) (x) = max{0, x − 3}. Thus lotteries are indeed not needed when there is only one good. Example E3 illustrates why this is not the case for multiple goods: replacing the lottery outcome with (0, 0); 0 yields the mechanism (q (2) , s (2) ), whose revenue is lower than that of (q, s) (whereas replacing 1/2; 1/2 with 0; 0 yields a higher revenue). In fact, the function b of (7) is an extreme point in B 2 (in particular, it is not the average of b (1) and b (2) ).
This is exactly where having more than one good matters. In the case of one good there is only one binding constraint per value x, namely, the outcome chosen by the next lower value. Consequently, dropping an outcome (such as a lottery outcome) chosen by x enables the seller to increase the rev-enue obtained from all higher-valuation buyers, as they can no longer switch to the outcome that has been removed and they strictly prefer their own outcome to any of the outcomes chosen by values below x. In contrast, when there are multiple goods, such an increase in revenue may not be possible because there may be multiple binding constraints per each valuation x (in our example, buyer (3, 3) is indifferent between reporting truthfully and reporting either (1, 0) or (0, 2)). These buyer types may switch to other outcomes that involve other goods, and so the total revenue may well decrease.
Next, how does a lottery outcome increase revenue? The seller would like to earn positive revenue from selling good 1 to the (1, 0) buyer, but without jeopardizing the higher revenue obtained from selling the bundle of both goods to the (3, 3) buyer (and, as we have seen, he cannot increase the price of the bundle because of the "good 2 for price 2," alternative, i.e., (0, 1); 2 ). If the price of good 1 is above 1 then (1, 0) will not buy it; if it is below 1, then (3, 3) will switch from buying the bundle to buying good 1 (since his payoff will increase from 1 to 2 or more).
32 Thus selling good 1 does not help. What does help is selling only a fractional part of good 1, which has the effect of making this option less attractive to the high-valuation buyer (3, 3) (since his possible gain is smaller: it is only that fraction of the difference in values). Thus, the two conflicting desiderata-getting some revenue from a low-valuation buyer, and not jeopardizing the higher revenue from a highervaluation buyer-are reconciled by offering for sale fractions of the goods, i.e., lotteries. In the present example, that optimal fraction turns out to be 1/2; it comes from balancing the incentives between the two goods (specifically, it is the ratio of two value differences, 3 − 2 for good 2 and 3 − 1 for good 1; see the Proof of Proposition 8 above).
33
Finally, we note that mechanism design is a sequential game, with the seller moving first. In such games, the use of randomization may in general be strictly advantageous to the first mover (take for instance the sequential "matching pennies" game). Thus, the surprising fact here is not that randomizations can increase revenue (when there are multiple goods), but that they cannot do so when there is only one good.
34,35

Lotteries for independent and identically distributed goods
We now provide a simple example where lotteries are necessary to achieve the maximal revenue for two goods that are independent and identically distributed.
Example E4. Let F be the following one-dimensional probability distribution:
1, with probability 1/6, 2, with probability 1/2, 4, with probability 1/3, and take two independent F -distributed goods, i.e., F = F × F.
Proposition 9
The mechanism (q, s) defined by
Valuations Outcome
(1, 4), (4, 1), (2, 2), (2, 4), (4, 2), (4, 4) (1, 1) 4
with b(x 1 , x 2 ) = max 0, 1 2 x 1 − 1, 1 2 x 2 − 1, x 1 + x 2 − 4 (9)
is the unique optimal mechanism for F = F × F of Example E4. 34 We thank Bob Aumann for this comment.
35 Pycia (2006) shows how in the multiple-goods case non-deterministic mechanisms are generically needed to maximize revenue.
Proof. First, the revenue from the mechanism (8) The left-hand side turns out to be precisely 36 times the expected revenue of the seller for the distribution F = F ×F , i.e., 36E F [s(x)] , and the right-hand side is bounded from above by 122 (replace all q 1 and q 2 there by their upper bound of 1). Therefore E F [s(x)] ≤ 122/36 = 61/18. Recalling that 61/18 is precisely the revenue of the mechanism (8) shows that (8) is optimal. Finally, to see that (8) is the only optimal mechanism: by the proof above, for the maximal revenue of 61/18 to be achieved, all the inequalities must become equalities. First, all the q 1 and q 2 appearing on the right-hand side of (11) Together with (12) this yields precisely the mechanism (8).
It can be checked that the maximal revenue achievable by a deterministic mechanism is 10/3 (obtained by the mechanism with price 2 for each good).
